A deep dive into ‘Urban Splash’ – beneath the surface of remediation contribution orders
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision in ‘Urban Splash’ is not for those short on time. It runs to 260 pages and concerned 7 high-rise residential properties in Manchester developed by Urban Splash Limited between 2000 and 2008. Following the Grenfell Tower fire, investigations were undertaken into the safety of these buildings and it was alleged that they each contained serious fire-safety defects. The defects were remediated with approximately £51.5 million of the remediation costs funded through the Building Safety Fund (BSF).
The Government applied for remediation contribution orders (RCOs) against Urban Splash Limited and associated entities. The central question for the Tribunal was whether remediation costs initially funded by the taxpayer through the BSF should remain with the taxpayer or whether liability for all or part of those costs should be transferred to the developer and/or entities alleged to be associated with it.
Below are some key takeaways from the decision:
The Government has flexed its muscles
Section 124 of the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) gives the Tribunal power to make an RCO requiring a developer, landlord or associated company to contribute towards the cost of remedying building safety defects.
The Secretary of State is identified in Section 124 as a party with standing to make an application for an RCO. It will have been precisely in the circumstances that arose here (namely where remediation works were funded through one of the Government building remediation funds) that the Secretary of State was identified as a party with standing. This decision makes clear (if clarity were needed) that the Government will pursue developers and others responsible for the creation of defects (together with their associated parties) for reimbursement of sums expended by building safety and cladding remediation funds.
The meaning of control
In the Urban Splash case, the “Respondents” included Urban Splash Limited and 10 other companies argued to be associated with it for the purposes of Section 124. The case has given rise to an unusually complex combination of technical, factual, financial and legal issues and the application of the association test to determine which of the respondent companies fell within the statutory provisions governing association is key to the decision. The starting point, it seems, is that in the case of an associated entity, the nature and strength of its connections with the developer, the relevant buildings and any wider property-centred enterprise are important considerations in deciding whether it should contribute.
Association is defined in Section 121 of the BSA and there are a variety of different tests for establishing association within Section 121 incorporating the concept of control. Section 121(8) states “A body corporate (X) controls another body corporate (Y) if X has the power, directly or indirectly, to secure that the affairs of Y are conducted in accordance with X’s wishes.” The Tribunal was invited to choose between a narrow and a broad construction of Section 121(8).
In considering the two principal questions:
- whether control can be exercised through the powers of common individuals, rather than only through conventional corporate ownership structures or constitutional rights.; and
- what degree of power is required before those arrangements amount to control by X of Y,
the Tribunal provided clarity on what it considers needs to be proven to establish control for the purposes of Section 121(8).
The Tribunal’s detailed analysis merits a standalone commentary. In summary, however, establishing control requires proof that X has the practical ability to secure that Y’s affairs are conducted in accordance with X’s wishes. Key points of note include:
- Practical power: X must have the power, directly or indirectly, to secure that Y’s affairs are conducted in accordance with X’s wishes. This is not confined to particular legal rights or conventional corporate ownership structures.
- Control may operate through common individuals: The powers of individuals involved in both X and Y may provide the mechanism through which X controls Y. However, having common directors, shareholders, members or persons with significant control does not, by itself, establish control.
- The power must be attributable to X: It must be shown that the individuals’ powers are the means through which X secures the implementation of its wishes, rather than simply evidence that the same individuals have power over both companies.
- Influence is not enough: Strategic alignment, commercial dependence, shared objectives, overlapping personnel or an ability to persuade do not, without more, satisfy the test. X must possess the practical ability to obtain its desired outcome. Section 121(8) of the BSA does not use the language of significant influence. Nor does it adopt the persons of significant control (PSC) formulation of “significant influence or control”. Instead, it requires control.
- Control need not be exclusive: It may be concurrent or exercised jointly, but X must still possess the requisite power, either alone or through a mechanism in which its participation is necessary or determinative. Being one influential voice among others who remain free to reject its wishes is insufficient.
In short, the test is broad as to how control may be exercised, but demanding as to the degree of power required: X must be able to secure the outcome it wants, not merely influence Y’s decision-making.
Materiality of relevant defects
An RCO can be made in respect of costs associated with remediation of relevant defects. The Respondents in this case argued that the test for a relevant defect should include a materiality threshold and that the intention of the BSA was not to classify all matters that might present a fire risk as relevant defects, no matter how theoretical and/or trivial that risk may be. The Tribunal rejected this argument and made clear previous decisions had established that what was required was a defect causing a risk to safety; the degree of risk was not relevant to that definition. The Tribunal did make clear that the level of risk might be relevant in determining what works are required (and therefore the level of contribution) but that was distinct from the argument being advanced by the Respondents that there was a materiality threshold to be met before an RCO application could be brought.
Competing remedial solutions
Where relevant defects have been identified and there are alternative remedial schemes it remains the case that the Tribunal has to assess which competing scheme might be considered the most reasonable with cost not being the sole determining factor. Therefore it does not follow that the reasonable scheme is necessarily the cheapest or the most expensive. Importantly, the Tribunal rejected the Government’s argument that the scheme approved by the BSF should be considered reasonable. BSF approval did not remove the need for the Tribunal to assess reasonableness in every RCO case.
The Tribunal also confirmed that the scope of an RCO was not limited to remediation of the defects themselves but extended to all preparatory and consequential works.
Morality has no direct relevance to the just and equitable test
One line of the Government’s arguments in support of RCOs was grounded in morality, with the contention being that Urban Splash had failed to ‘do the right thing’. The Tribunal confirmed that, when considering whether it was just and equitable to make an RCO, it was not an exercise in benchmarking conduct against an undefined moral standard. That is not to say that conduct is irrelevant – as it plainly is; rather, the question is whether the conduct of a respondent to an RCO application affects the fairness of any decision on whether to make an RCO. It was also made clear that the fact a refusal to make an RCO would leave the taxpayer to meet the cost of remediation does not in and of itself make an RCO just and equitable. To treat that fact as determinative would, in effect, create a two-tier system of RCOs.
The nature and strength of the connection is material
The Tribunal confirmed that when considering whether an associated entity should be made subject to an RCO the nature and strength of its connection with the developer is an important consideration, as is its connection with the relevant buildings themselves and their connection with the wider real estate enterprise of the developer. In this case RCOs were made against a number of associated companies through which the developer conducted its property development business. However, an RCO was also made against one specific Respondent which was established after the offending buildings had been constructed. The rationale for making an RCO against that entity was driven by the members being Urban Splash’s senior leadership team.
In contrast, RCOs were not made against two companies that, while meeting the test of association, were established to undertake activities that were entirely distinct from the property development activity that was central to this dispute. The Tribunal confirmed that just because an associated entity had assets from which an RCO could be satisfied does not lead to an inevitable conclusion that an RCO must be made against it. Absent a connection with the offending activities the wealth or asset strength of an associated party will not lead to an RCO being made against it.
Just and equitable applies to liability and quantum
The Tribunal ordered that the liable Respondents are jointly and severally liable to meet the RCO judgment (of c£46m). No apportionment between RCO payers was made. The Tribunal confirmed that where RCOs are sought and obtained against a number of associated parties the liability can be made joint and several but that is not the starting point or default. The exercise for the Tribunal is to consider, in relation to each liable Respondent, what form and extent of liability would produce the most just and equitable outcome. In this case there was no ability to undertake an evidence-based apportionment / allocation of liability and that led to the conclusion of the Tribunal that the liability here should be joint and several.
Whataboutism is not a (complete) defence
While only directly relevant when considering RCO applications brought by the Government the Tribunal has confirmed that it is no defence to point to the legislative and regulatory failings identified in the Hackitt Review and the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. However, the Tribunal did consider that some adjustment to the amount ordered to be contributed should be made to reflect the Government’s failings identified in post-Grenfell reviews and which had been accepted by the Government. This resulted in a 10% reduction in the sums that would otherwise have been ordered to be paid by way of contribution. The Tribunal went on to say that had the buildings in question been compliant with the standards in place at the time of their construction, knowing what we now know about the adequacy of those standards the percentage discount would have been greater than 10%.
Whether this part of the decision will be appealed by the Government is unknown. If it is not, it does lead to the prospect of a taxpayer- funded shortfall in other RCO cases brought by the Secretary of State.
Conclusion
Urban Splash and four of its associated companies were ordered to pay c£46.5 million to cover the remediation costs, making it the largest RCO to date. This case is also an important step in the Government’s efforts to recover public money spent on building remediation.
This is, however, a First-tier Tribunal decision, so although the analysis is detailed and likely to be influential, its interpretation is not equivalent to an appellate determination of the point.
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